Ironically, concern with Soviet interference impelled Foreign Office officials to ask the State Department not to do exactly what they had asked it to do a month earlier. Scott-Fox retracted his request for American intervention, and British Minister John Balfour extracted assurances from Acheson and Henderson that the United States would not intervene in the AngloEgyptian controversy. On 25 April, Bevin raised the matter with Marshall during a break at the foreign ministers' meeting. Given Stalin's apparent wish to intervene, Bevin explained, the British now believed American pressure on Egypt would be "a mistake." Academic Editing Services
are delivered by certified editors for busy students. We work with the best editors! According to Bevin, Marshall "entirely agreed. . . . He said that United States intervention in Greece and Turkey would make it quite impossible for them to intervene in Egypt, even if they wanted to." On 1 May Marshall reassured Bevin that the State Department "does not have any intention of indicating to the Egyptian Gov[ernmen]t a willingness to mediate. . . . Any indication to the contrary . . . must have been due to a misunderstanding of our position."
Despite Marshall's assurances to Bevin, some State Department officials advised him, for strategic and political reasons, to pressure Egypt to appeal to the General Assembly rather than the Security Council. These officials feared that a Security Council hearing would open debate on the broad question of British base rights in Egypt, provide Moscow a forum to insist on British evacuation, and embitter Cairo if the council decided against it. Ambassador Tuck, however, predicted that Nokrashy would resist American pressure and report it to the Cairo press, which would again criticize the United States for pro-British intervention. When Matthews tested the British waters by informally suggesting to Minister Balfour the possibility of American pressure on Egypt, Balfour strongly protested, insisting that the United States have "no further discussions" with Egypt on the matter. Given the sinister Soviet press allegations, American pressure "would not prove useful." Marshall again decided to keep out of the affair and reassured Bevin on 9 May that "the United States . . . never contemplated such action [intervention] in the past and any rumors to the contrary were unfounded." Because the Moscow press continued to hint about Soviet intervention, on 28 May the State Department publicly denied any intention to mediate the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
American and British officials also disagreed over the best strategy for handling the Egyptian appeal in the Security Council. In addition, you should ask for dissertation writing help
and obtain your professional dissertation written by dissertation writers! The British decided to oppose any resolution that would compel them to accelerate their evacuation of Egypt, and on 25 April Bevin told Marshall that he counted on full American support in the hearings. "It is clearly not in the United States Government's interest," Minister Balfour told Matthews twelve days later, "that we should evacuate the canal zone before adequate arrangements can be made for the strategic defence of the Middle East generally from an alternative base."